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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a new ID-based event-oriented linkable ring signature scheme, with an option as revocable-iff-linked. With this option, if
a user generates two linkable ring signatures in the same event, everyone
can compute his identity from these two signatures. We are the first in the
literature to propose such a secure construction in ID-based setting. Even
compared with other existing non ID-based schemes, we enjoy significant
efficiency improvement, including constant signature size and linking complexity.
Our scheme can be also regarded as a normal ID-based ring signature.
We are also the first to propose such a scheme with constant signature size
and enhanced privacy, namely the signer is anonymous even to the PKG who
has the master secret key.
We prove the security of our scheme in the random oracle model, using
DL, DDL and q-SDH assumptions.
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Signatures
1. Introduction
Ring Signature. A ring signature scheme (such as [30, 1, 40, 8, 39, 17, 14])
allows members of a group to sign messages on behalf of the group without
any necessity to reveal their identities, i.e., providing signer anonymity. Additionally, it is impossible to decide whether two signatures have been issued
by the same group member. In contrast to the notion of a group signature
scheme (such as [11, 10, 5]), the group formation in a ring signature is spontaneous and there exists no group manager who is responsible for revoking
the signer’s identity. That is, under the assumption that each user is already
associated with a public key of any standard signature scheme, a user can
form a group by simply collecting the public keys of all the group members
including his own. These diversion group members can be totally unaware
of being conscripted into the group.
Applications of ring signature schemes include whistle blowing [30], anonymous membership authentication for ad hoc groups [9], non-interactive deniable ring authentication [32], perfect concurrent signature [33] and multidesignated verifiers signature [22].
A “regular” ring signature is unlinkable. That is, no one can determine
whether two ring signatures are generated by the same signer.
Linkable Ring Signature. Linkable ring signatures was first proposed by
Liu et al. [25] in 2004. In this notion, the identity of the signer in a ring
signature remains anonymous, but two ring signatures can be linked if they
are signed by the same signer. Linkable ring signatures are suitable in many
different practical applications, such as ad-hoc network authentication [25],
e-voting [12] and e-cash [36]. Regular ring signatures cannot be used for
e-voting since any double votes remain undetectable as they are unlinkable.
No one is able to find out whether any two signatures (with two votes) are
generated by the same voter or not. Linkable ring signatures provide the
remedy to this problem by allowing the public to detect any signer who has
produced two or more signatures (i.e., votes).
We note that linkability is compulsorily embedded into the signature instead of voluntarily added in linkable ring signatures. If the signer refuses to
add the correct linking information, the whole signature becomes invalid. In
other words, linkability is enforced by the verifier. The signer cannot decline
2

to do so. This is different from voluntarily added linkability. In this case,
whether allowing the signature to be linked or not can be decided by the
signer. This issue is also explained in [25].
Linkability can only happen within the same event (e.g., a voting event).
Two signatures from two different events cannot be linked, even though they
are generated by the same signer. Although the earlier schemes such as
[25, 26, 27] do not mention about this property, they can be modified trivially
to achieve this property.
Revocable Ring Signature. In a revocable ring signature [23], any member of the group is able to revoke the anonymity of the actual signer. This is
different from group signature. For group signature, only the group manager
has the power to do so. Furthermore, the formation of the group requires the
assistance of the group manager. For revokable ring signature, since there
is no group manager, the formation of the group still remains spontaneous,
as in conventional ring signature. In other words, it explicitly provides all
the group members the privilege of identifying the actual signer of any ring
signature that has been generated on behalf of their group, while still keeping
the actual signer anonymous to all the ‘outsiders’ (those who do not belong
to the group).
Revocable-iff-Linked Ring Signature. A Revocable-iff-Linked ring signature [3, 19, 18] ([19, 18] described the same context as “Traceable Ring
Signature”) possesses the normal properties of a linkable ring signature. In
addition, if two sigantures are linked (generated by the same user), the identity of this user will be revealed in the public. That is, his anonymity will
be revoked if and only if he generates two ring signatures. Note that it is
different from Revocable Ring Signature. In the latter, the anonymity of the
actual user will be revoked unconditionally by other users within the ring.
For other entities, the anonymity will be preserved in any circumstance.
There are many applications for revocable-iff-linked ring signature. It
can be applied in anonymous e-voting scheme [12], unclonable group identification [15, 18] and can be extended to k-times anonymous authentication
[34, 18].
The scheme proposed by Au et al. [3] is in identity-based setting. However, it was later proven insecure [21]. The other secure schemes [19, 18] are
all in public-key based.

3

Identity-based Cryptography. Identity-based (ID-based) cryptosystem,
introduced by Shamir [31], eliminated the need for checking the validity of
the certificates. In an ID-based cryptosystem, public key of each user is easily computable from a string corresponding to this user’s identity (e.g. an
email address, a telephone number, etc.). A private key generator (PKG)
then computes the private keys from a master secret for the users. This
property avoids the necessity of certificates and associates an implicit public
key (user identity) to each user within the system. Signature verification
only requires the identity of the signer. The inefficient and costly certificates
and the corresponding checking process are eliminated.
1.1. Challenge for ID-based Linkable Ring Signature
ID-based ring signature combines the property of ring signature and IDbased signature. However, we have to take extra care for the design of
schemes. While some of the existing schemes provide anonymity unconditionally, others are computational only. The Private Key Generator (PKG)
itself may have extra advantage in breaking the anonymity since it is in
possession of all the private keys. This problem does not sound serious in
normal ID-based ring signature scheme because almost all existing schemes is
unconditionally anonymous. However, in the case of linkable ring signatures,
it is still an open problem to construct one with unconditional anonymity.
The inherent constraint is that anonymity in linkable ring signature cannot
be unconditional. The capability of linking implies some the signature must
contain some information about the actual signer. Within the constraint of
computational anonymity, it is a great challenge of providing privacy in an
ID-based setting to the PKG, as it is in possession of all users’ secret keys.
Given any ring signature, the PKG can create a set of linkable ring-signatures
on behalf of each member in the ring for the same event. Next, the PKG
can identify the actual signer of the given ring signature by checking which
signature does the given signature is linked to. We require special attention
in the design of the scheme. Looking ahead, we alter the semantic of traditional ID-based signature. In our proposal, the user obtains his/her secret
key from the PKG via an interactive protocol in which that some part of
the key obtained by the user is unknown to the PKG. This is to allow us to
provide the proof of anonymity against the PKG under some well-established
computational assumptions.
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1.2. Contribution
We propose a new ID-based Linkable Ring Signature scheme with Revocableiff-Linked as an option. Our scheme has the following merits:
1. There are only 2 secure ID-based Linkable Ring Signature schemes.
When compared to the first one proposed by Chow et al. [13], our
scheme achieves a higher level of anonymity. In our scheme, even the
PKG cannot tell who is the actual signer. On the other side, the PKG
in [13] can easily compute the signer of any given signature under any
circumstance.
2. When compared to the second ID-based Linkable Ring Signature scheme
proposed by Tsang et al. [35], our scheme achieves a constant size signature which is independent to the number of users included in the
ring.
3. Since the one proposed in [3] is insecure [21], we are the first to propose
a secure construction of ID-based Revocable-iff-Linked Ring Signature
scheme. We prove the security using DL, DDH and q-SDH assumptions
in the random oracle model.
4. When compared to the (non ID-based) Revocable-iff-Linked Ring Signature schemes [19, 18] (as known as traceable ring signature), our
scheme achieves constant signature size while the scheme in [19] is
with linear signature size and the scheme in [18] can achieve at most
sub-linear size.
We summarize our merits in table 1.
1.2.1. Organization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Some preliminaries will be
presented in Section 2. We will describe our security model in Section 3. We
are going to present our scheme in Section 4, followed by a formal security
analysis in Section 5. Finally we conclude our paper in Section 6.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notations
Let ê be a bilinear map such that ê : G1 × G2 → GT .
• G1 and G2 are cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p.
5

Table 1: Comparison of Linkable Ring Signatures

Scheme
Liu et al. [24]
Tsang and Wei [37]
Liu and Wong [26]
Au et al. [2]
Zheng et al. [41]
Tsang et al. [38]
Tsang et al. [35]
Chow et al. [13]
Fujisaki and Suzuki [19]
Fujisaki [18]
Our Scheme

Signature
ID
anony.
Size
-based to PKG
O(n)
×
N.A.
O(1)
×
N.A.
O(n)
×
N.A.
O(1)
×
N.A.
O(n)
×
N.A.
O(n)
×
N.A.
O(n)
X
X
O(1)
X
×
O(n)
×
N.A.
√
O( n)
×
N.A.
O(1)
X
X

revoke
Linking
-iff-link Complexity
×
O(1)
×
O(1)
×
O(1)
×
O(1)
×
O(1)
×
O(n2 )
×
O(n2 )
×
O(1)
X
O(n)
X
O(n log n)
X
O(1)

• each element of G1 , G2 and GT has unique binary representation.
• g0 , h0 are generators of G1 and G2 respectively.
• ψ : G2 → G1 is a computable isomorphism from G2 to G1 , with ψ(h0 ) =
g0 .
• (Bilinear) ∀x ∈ G1 , y ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zp , ê(xa , y b ) = ê(x, y)ab .
• (Non-degenerate) ê(g0 , h0 ) 6= 1.
G1 and G2 can be the same or different groups. If the group operation
in G1 and G2 , the isomorphism ψ and the bilinear map ê are all efficiently
computable, the groups (G1 , G2 ) are referred to as a bilinear group pair.
2.2. Mathematical Assumptions
Definition 1 (Discrete Logarithm). The Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem
in G is defined as follows: On input a tuple (Y, g) ∈ G2 such that |G| = p
for some prime p, output a ∈ Zp such that Y = g a . The advantage of
an algorithm that solves the DL problem is the probability that it outputs a.
We say that the (t, )-DL assumption holds in G if no t-time algorithm has
advantage at least  in solving the DL problem in G.
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Definition 2 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman). The Decisional Diffie-Hellman
(DDH) problem in G is defined as follows: On input a quadruple (g, h, g a , T ) ∈
G4 such that |G| = p for some prime p, output 1 if T = ha and 0 otherwise.
The advantage of an algorithm that solves the DDH problem is the probability
that it outputs the correct bit. We say that the (t, )-DDH assumption holds
in G if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least  over random guessing in
solving the DDH problem in G.
Definition 3 (q-Strong Diffie-Hellman). The q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (qSDH) problem in (G1 , G2 ) is defined as follows: On input a (q + 2)-tuple
2
q
(x+c)
(g0 , h0 , hx0 , hx0 , · · · , hx0 ) ∈ G1 × Gq+1
=
2 , output a pair (A, c) such that A
∗
g0 where c ∈ Zp . The advantage of an algorithm that solves the q-SDH problem is the probability that it outputs a tuple (A, c). We say that the (q, t, )SDH assumption holds in (G1 , G2 ) if no t-time algorithm has advantage at
least  in solving the q-SDH problem in (G1 , G2 ).
The q-SDH assumption is shown to be true in the generic group model
[7].
3. Security Model
3.1. Definition
The security definitions of ID-Based Linkable Ring Signature and IDBased Revocable-iff-Linked Ring Signature are very similar. Therefore we
describe the security notions of them together, and their differences are specified at appropriate places.
An ID-Based Linkable (or Revocable-iff-Linked) Ring Signature scheme
is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms and protocol
below:
• Setup. On input an unary string 1λ where λ is a security parameter, the algorithm outputs a master secret key s and a list of system
parameters param that includes λ and the descriptions of a user secret
key space D, a message space M as well as a signature space Ψ.
• Extract. The common input of this interactive protocol between
a user and the PKG is the system paratmers param and an identity
IDi ∈ {0, 1}∗ for a user. The PKG has additional private input the
master secret key s. Upon successful completion of the protocol, the
7

user outputs a secret key di ∈ D. When we say identity IDi corresponds
to user secret key di or vice versa, we mean di is the output of the
Extract protocol (at the user side) with respect to common input
param and IDi .
• Sign. On input a list param of system parameters, a group size n
of length polynomial in λ, a set {IDi ∈ {0, 1}∗ |i ∈ [1, n]} of n user
identities, a message m ∈ M, an event identifier event ∈ {0, 1}∗ and
a secret key {dj ∈ D|j ∈ [1, n]}, the algorithm outputs an ID-based
linkable (or revocable-iff-linked) ring signature σ ∈ Ψ.
• Verify. On input a list param of system parameters, a group size n
of length polynomial in λ, a set {IDi ∈ {0, 1}∗ |i ∈ [1, n]} of n user
identities, a message m ∈ M, an event identifier event ∈ {0, 1}∗ a
signature σ ∈ Ψ, it outputs either valid or invalid.
• Link. On input an event identifier event ∈ {0, 1}∗ and two signatures
σ1 , σ2 ∈ Ψ, it outputs either link or unlink.
• Revoke. (For ID-based revocable-iff-linked ring signature only.) On
input an event identifier event ∈ {0, 1}∗ and two signatures σ1 , σ2 ∈ Ψ
such that link ← Link(σ1 , σ2 ), it outputs ID.
Correctness. An ID-Based Linkable / Revocable-iff-Linked Ring Signature
scheme should satisfy:
• Verification Correctness – Signatures signed by honest signers are verified to be valid.
• Linking Correctness – If two signatures are linked, they must be generated from the same secret key of the same signer.
• Revoking Correctness – For ID-Based Revocable-iff-Linked Ring Signature, it requires that the output of Revoke of two linked signatures
must be the actual signer.
3.2. Security Requirement of ID-based Linkable Ring Signature
A secure ID-Based Linkable Ring Signature scheme should possess unforgeability, anonymity, linkability and non-slanderability which will be defined below.
8

3.2.1. Unforgeability.
An adversary should not be able to forge any signature just from the
identities of the group members. We specify a security model which mainly
captures the following two attacks:
1. Adaptive chosen message attack
2. Adaptive chosen identity attack
Adaptive chosen message attack allows an adversary to obtain messagesignature pairs on demand during the forging attack. Adaptive chosen identity attack allows the adversary to forge a signature with respect to a group
chosen by the adversary. To support adaptive chosen message attack, we
provide the adversary the following oracle queries.
• Extraction oracle (EO): On input IDi , di ← Extract(param, IDi , s)
is returned . The oracle is stateful, meaning that if IDi = IDj , then
di = dj .
• Signing oracle (SO): A chooses a group of n identities {IDi }i∈[1,n] ,
a signer identity IDj among them, an event identifier event and a
message m, the oracle outputs a valid ID-based linkable (or revocableiff-linked) ring signature denoted by σ ← Sign(param, n, {IDi |i ∈
[1, n]}, m, event, dj ). The signing oracle may query the extraction oracle during its operation.
• Hash oracle (H): A can ask for the values of the hash functions for
any input.
We have the following unforgeability game:
1. A simulator S takes a sufficiently large security parameter λ and runs
Setup to generate the public parameters param and master secret key
s. The adversary A is given param.
2. A can make a polynomial number of oracle queries to EO, SO and H
adaptively.
3. A outputs a signature σ ∗ for message m∗ , event event∗ and a set of
identities L∗ .
A wins the above game if
1. Verify(param, |L∗ |, L∗ , m∗ , event∗ , σ ∗ ) = valid;
9

2. (L∗ , m∗ , event∗ ) and σ ∗ should not be in the set of oracle queries and
replies between A and SO; and
3. A did not query EO on any identity ID ∈ L∗ .
The advantage of A is defined as the probability that A wins.
Definition 4 (Unforgeability). A scheme is unforgeable if no PPT adversary
has non-negligible advantage in winning the above game.
3.2.2. L-Anonymity.
An adversary should not be able to tell the identity of the signer with
a probability larger than 1/n, where n is the cardinality of the ring. A
crucial difference between Anonymity for ring signatures and L-Anonymity
for linkable ring signatures is that in the latter, the adversary cannot query
signatures of a user who appears in the challenge phase under the same event.
The rationale is that if the adversary obtains any signature of user i, it can
tell if the challenge signature is generated by this user due to the linking
property.
Different from a non-ID-based linkable ring signature scheme, the PKG
who knows the master secret key (thus it knows the secret key of every user),
may gain advantage on the anonymity of a signature. In order to capture
this potential attack, we enhance our model in a way that the adversary is
also given the master secret key.
In order to capture the potential attack, we further define the following
oracle:
• Reversed Extraction oracle (REO): The only difference between
REO and the traditional EO is that, it is simulated by the adversary
instead of the simulator. The initial request can be made by the adversary if the extracted protocol is an interactive one. In this case, the
simulator acts as an honest user to provide interactions and the oracle records the necessary transcript of the interaction. Note that this
maybe different from the final output of the interaction protocol due
to some secret information which is only known to the honest user.
We have the following anonymity game:
1. A simulator S takes a sufficiently large security parameter λ and runs
Setup to generate the public parameters param and master secret key
s. The adversary A is given param and s.
10

2. A can make a polynomial number of oracle queries to REO, SO and
H adaptively.
3. In the challenge phase, A picks two identities ID0∗ , ID1∗ , which are
not queried to the SO as a signer. A also picks a message m∗ , an
event event∗ and a set of n identities L∗ . Then A receives a challenge
signature σ ∗ = Sign(param, n + 2, L∗ ∪ {ID0∗ , ID1∗ }, m∗ , event∗ , dIDb∗ ),
where b ∈ {0, 1}.
4. A can queries oracles REO, SO and H adaptively, where (ID0∗ , event∗ )
and (ID1∗ , event∗ ) are not queried to the SO.
5. Finally A outputs a guess b0 ∈ {0, 1}.
A wins the above game if b = b0 . The advantage of A is defined as the
probability that A wins minus 1/2.
Definition 5 (Anonymity). A scheme is anonymous if no PPT adversary
has non-negligible advantage in winning the above game.
Note 1: Although the adversary has the master secret key and it can
generate an additional secret key for ID0∗ or ID1∗ , this secret key is different
from the one owned by ID0∗ or ID1∗ (generated by REO). According to our
definition of Linking Correctness, those signatures generated by these two
secret keys cannot be linked, although they are corresponding to the same
identity.
3.2.3. Linkability.
An adversary should not be able to form two signatures with the same
secret key in the same event without being linked by the Link protocol.
We further generalize the notion that an adversary with k secret keys cannot
create k + 1 signatures in the same event without being linked.
We have the following linkability game:
1. A simulator S takes a sufficiently large security parameter λ and runs
Setup to generate the public parameters param and master secret key
s. The adversary A is given param.
2. A can make a polynomial number of oracle queries to EO, SO and H
adaptively.
3. A outputs an event event∗ , a positive integer k, a set of signatures σi∗
for messages m∗i and sets of identities L∗i for i = 0 to k.
Let C be the set of identities queried to EO. A wins the above game if:
11

• σi for i = 0 to k are not outputs from SO.
• Verify(param, |L∗i |, L∗i , m∗i , event∗ , σi∗ ) = valid for i = 0 to k;
• Link(σi∗ , σj∗ ) = Unlink for all i, j ∈ {0, . . . , k} such that i 6= j; and
• |(L∗0 ∪ L∗1 ∪ . . . ∪ L∗k ) ∩ C| ≤ k.
The advantage of A is defined as the probability that A wins.
Definition 6 (Linkability). A scheme is linkable if no PPT adversary has
non-negligible advantage in winning the above game.
3.2.4. Non-slanderability.
Informally speaking, non-slanderability ensure that no adversary, can
frame an honest user for signing a signature. That is, an adversary cannot produce a valid signature that is linked to a signature generated by a
user. In addition to the above oracles, we define one more:
• Challenged Signing oracle (CSO): The only difference between
CSO and the traditional SO is that, it requires the simulator to use the
secret key queried from the REO and execute Sign algorithm specified
in the scheme to generate the signature. REO should be queried before
if necessary.
Formally it is defined as follows:
1. A simulator S takes a sufficiently large security parameter λ and runs
Setup to generate param and master secret key s. S sends param and
s to the adversary A.
2. A makes a polynomial number of oracle queries to REO and H in an
adaptive manner.
3. A submits a polynomial number of oracle queries to CSO adaptively
for generating challenged signatures.
4. A outputs a signature σ ∗ for message m∗ , event event∗ and ring L∗ .
A wins the game if
• Verify(param, |L∗ |, L∗ , m∗ , event∗ , σ ∗ ) returns valid.
• σ ∗ is not an output of any CSO query.
12

• Link(σ ∗ , σ̂) = Link where σ̂ is any signature outputted from CSO.
Definition 7 (Non-slanderability). A scheme is non-slanderability if no PPT
adversary has non-negligible advantage in winning the above game.
Note 2: Although the adversary may initialize the query of REO, it
cannot get the user secret key since it does not know some secret information
which is only known to the honest user (that is, the simulator in this game).
Thus it cannot generate a signature by that particular secret key which is
linked together with some signatures outputted by CSO. In addition, the
remark of Note 1 also applies here.
Theorem 1. For an ID-based linkable ring signature scheme, if it is linkable
and non-slanderable, it implies that it is unforgeable.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there exists an adversary A
who can win game unforgeability with non-negligible probability. We show
how to construct an adversary A0 that can win game linkability or game
non-slanderability with blackbox access to A.
In order for A to win, it must output a valid signature σ ∗ for message m∗ , event event∗ and a set of identities L∗ . Due to the setting of
the game, A has not issued any EO query with input ID ∈ L∗ . Let m 6= m∗
be a random message and σi = Sign(param, |L∗ |, L∗ , m, event∗ , di ), where
di = Extract(param, IDi , s). The forger A can be classified into two types
according to the characteristic of σ ∗ with respect to these σi ’s.
1. Type I. There exists an i such that link ← Link(σ ∗ , σi , event∗ ).
2. Type II. For all i unlink ← Link(σ ∗ , σi , event∗ ).
For type I forger A, we show how to construct A0 that wins game nonslanderability. For type II forger A, we show how to construct A0 that
wins game linkability. The view provided by A0 to A is indistinguishable in
these two cases. Thus, if A can win with non-negligible probability in game
unforfeability, A0 either win game non-slanderability or game linkability with
non-negligible probability.
Type I Forger. A0 receives param and s from S in game non-slanderability.
A0 forwards param to A. For each EO query made by A, A0 uses the master
secret key s to answer the query. For each SO query made by A, A0 made
an REO query.
13

Finally, A submits a forgery σ ∗ for message m∗ , event event∗ and a set
of identities L∗ . If σ ∗ links to any of the output from the previous REO
query, A0 wins the game directly. Otherwise, A0 randomly picks an index
i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , |L∗ |} and issue an REO to the simulator on input IDi∗ . Next,
A issues a CSO query on input a random message m 6= m∗ , event event∗ ,
ring L∗ and index i∗ to obtain a signature σ. Since A is a type I forger, with
probability 1/|L∗ |, link ← Link(σ ∗ , σ, event∗ ). A0 submits σ ∗ , m∗ , event∗ , L∗
and wins game non-slanderability.
Type II Forger. A0 receives param from S in game linkability. A0 forwards
param to A. For each EO query made by A, A0 forwards the query to S.
Likewise, for each SO query made by A, A0 forwards the query to S.
Finally, A submits a forgery σ ∗ for message m∗ , event event∗ and a set of
identities L∗ . A0 randomly picks an index i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , |L∗ |} and issue an EO
query to the simulator on input IDi∗ to obtain a secret key di∗ . A0 randomly
picks a message m 6= m∗ , computes σ = Sign(param, |L∗ |, L∗ , m, event∗ , di∗ ).
Since A is a type II forger, unlink ← Link(σ ∗ , σ, event∗ ). A0 then outputs k =
1, event∗ , σ0∗ = σ ∗ , σ1∗ = σ, m∗0 = m∗ , m∗1 = m and win game linkability.
3.3. Security Requirement of ID-based Revocable-iff-Linked Ring Signature
The definitions of unforgeability and anonymity are the same as ID-based
Linkable Ring Signature defined in Section 3.2. We skip here.
3.3.1. Revoke-iff-Linkability.
An adversary should not be able to form two signatures with the same
secret key in the same event without being linked by the Link protocol or
the Revoke algorithm outputs an identity outside the ring. We further
generalize the notion to the case that an adversary with k secret keys cannot
create k + 1 signatures in the same event without being linked.
We have the following linkability game:
1. A simulator S takes a sufficiently large security parameter λ and runs
Setup to generate the public parameters param and master secret key
s. The adversary A is given param.
2. A can make a polynomial number of oracle queries to EO, SO and H
adaptively.
3. A outputs an event event∗ , a positive integer k, a set of signatures σi∗
for messages m∗i and sets of identities L∗i for i = 0 to k.
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Let C be the set of identities queried to EO. A wins the above game if
it fulfils either condition:
1.

• σi for i = 0 to k are not outputs from SO.
• Verify(param, |L∗i |, L∗i , m∗i , event∗ , σi∗ ) = valid for i = 0 to k;
• Link(σi∗ , σj∗ ) = Unlink for all i, j ∈ {0, . . . , k} such that i 6= j; and

• |(L∗0 ∪ L∗1 ∪ . . . ∪ L∗k ) ∩ C| ≤ k.
OR
2.
• there exists i, j ∈ {0, . . . , k} such that σi and σj are not outputs
from SO.
• Verify(param, |L∗b |, L∗b , m∗b , event∗ , σb∗ ) = valid for b ∈ {i, j};
• Link(σi∗ , σj∗ ) = Link; and
/ {L∗i ∪ L∗j } or ID0 has
• Revoke(σi∗ , σj∗ , event∗ ) = ID0 where ID0 ∈
not been inputted to EO.
The advantage of A is defined as the probability that A wins.
Definition 8 (Revoke-iff-Linkability). A scheme is revocable-iff-linked if no
PPT adversary has non-negligible advantage in winning the above game.
3.3.2. Non-slanderability in revocable-iff-linked ring signatures.
Definition of framing attack in ID-based revocable-iff-linked ring signature
covers two aspects of framing. The first one is that no attacker should be able
to create a signature that is linked to a signature created by an honest signer.
The second one is that no attacker should be able to create two signatures so
that when they are input to the algorithm Revoke, an identity of an honest
user will be the output. Formally, non-slanderability of revocable-iff-linked
ring signatures includes the one defined above in Section 3.2 (Def. 7) and
the definition of Revoke-iff-linkability (Def. 8).
Definition 9 (Non-slanderability for revocable-iff-linked ring signatures). A
revocable-iff-linked ring signatures is non-slanderable if no PPT adversary
has non-negligible advantage in winning the games defined in Def. 7 and
Def. 8.
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4. Our Proposed Schemes
4.1. Building Blocks
Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Knowledge. Our construction utilizes extensively
the well-established non-interactive zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge protocols. In a zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge protocol [20] (ZKPoK), a
prover convinces a verifier that some statement is true while the verifier
learns nothing except the validity of the statement. We follow the notation
introduced by Camenisch and Stadler [10] in which PK{(x) : y = g x } denotes a ZKPoK protocol that proves the knowledge of an integer x such that
y = g x holds. A large class of ZKPoK protocols, called Σ-protocol, can be
transformed into secure signature scheme in the random oracle model. The
resulting signature is often called signature of knowledge. Following the same
notation, the signature scheme corresponds to the protocol PK{(x) : y = g x }
will be denoted as SPK{(x) : y = g x }(M ). The Σ-protocol is inspired by the
protocols described in [4].
Accumulators. An accumulator allows the representation of a set of elements,
say, X = {x1 , . . . , xn } by a short value v. For each element x in the set X ,
there exists a corresponding value wx , called witness. Given v, x and wx ,
anyone can verify efficiently whether x is an element in the set that produces
the accumulator value v. Accumulator was first introduced in [6]. Dodis
et al. [16] illustrates how an accumulator can be used to construct constantsize ring signatures. Roughly, their idea is as follows. The signer produces
a short value v, which is the accumulation of the set of public keys in the
ring. Next, he produces an non-interactive proof of knowledge of the tuple
(x, wx ), which assures the verifier that x is one element of the set of the
public keys in the ring. Finally, the signer also creates a non-interactive
zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge of the secret key with respect to that
public key x. To verify the ring signature, the verifier checks if v is indeed
the result of the accumulation of all public keys in the ring as well as the noninteractive proofs. Ngyuen [28] proposed an accumulator in groups equipped
with bilinear maps and construct a constant-size ring signature in the IDbased setting. Our construction also makes use of accumulator to achieve
constant-size signature in a similar manner.
4.2. Construction
In this sub-section, we detail our construction.
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• Setup:
1. Init (Common parameter): Let λ be the security parameter. Let
ê be a bilinear pairing as described in Section 2.1 and (G1 , G2 ) be
a bilinear group pair with computable isomorphism ψ such that
|G1 | = |G2 | = p for some prime p of λ bits. Also let Gp be a group
of order p where DDH is intractable2 We define H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp ,
G0 : {0, 1}∗ → Gp and G1 : {0, 1}∗ → Gp be some cryptographic
hash functions. Let g0 , g1 , g2 be generators of G1 and h0 , h1 , h2 be
generators of group G2 such that ψ(hi ) = gi for i = 0, 1, 2.
2. Init (Accumulator): Choose a generator h of G2 . Randomly select
i
q ∈R Z∗p and compute qi = h(q ) for i = 1 · · · tmax , where tmax is
the maximum size of the ring.
3. PKG Setup: The PKG randomly selects γ ∈R Z∗p and compute
w = h0 γ . The master secret is γ while the public parameters are
(H, G0 , G1 , ψ, ê, G1 , G2 , Gp , p, g0 , g1 , g2 , h0 , h1 , h2 , h, q1 , . . . , qtmax , w).
• Extract: User with identity IDu obtain the corresponding secret key
from PKG through the following interactive protocol.
1. Let e = H(IDu ). User with identity IDu randomly selects s0 , rs ∈R
0
Z∗p , compute and sends C 0 = g1s g2rs to the PKG. The user also
conducts the following zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge protocol with the PKG.
0

PK{(s0 , rs ) : C 0 = g1s g2rs }
2. If PKG accepts the proof, it randomly selects s00 ∈R Z∗p and computes
1
00
C = C 0 g1s ,
A = (g0 C) e+γ
and sends (A, s00 ) to the user.
3. User computes s = s0 +s00 and checks if ê(A, whe0 ) = ê(g0 g1s g2rs , h0 ).
It then stores (A, s, rs ).
We only allow each user to obtain one secret key.
2

In practice, one could set Gp to be GT or a subgroup of the multiplicative group
modulo a prime p0 where p|p0 − 1.
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• Sign(Link Version): To sign a message m with a set of identities
L = |ID1 , . . . , IDn |, where n ≤ tmax , using the secret key of a user
with identity IDu (where u ∈ {1, n}) in an event event, first compute
e = H(IDu ), u0 = G0 (event) and

Qk=n

v = ψ(h

k=1



q+H(IDk )

Qk=n

),

vw = ψ(h

k=1,k6=u

H(IDk )+q



),

S = u0 s .

Note that although the user does not know q, he can still compute v as

Qk=n
q+H(ID
)
k
)
v = ψ(h k=1


q+H(ID1 ) ... q+H(IDn )
)
= ψ(h
= ψ(hq

n +c

qn

n−1 q

n−1 +...+c

q n−1 cn−1

1 q+c0

)

q c1 c0

= ψ(h (h
)
. . . (h ) h )
cn−1
c1 c0
= ψ(qn qn−1 . . . q1 h )

(1)

where c0 , . . . , cn−1 ∈ Zp are some coefficients. vw can be computed in
a similar way.
Denote M = m||L||event. The user further computes the following
non-interactive signature-of-knowledge Π0 which assures the verifier the
following relationship are satisfied.

SPK





(A, e, s, rs , vw ) :


ê(A, whe0 ) = ê(g0 g1s g2rs , h0 ) 
∧ ê(vw , q1 he ) = ê(v, h)
(M )

s
∧
S = u0

The SPK Π0 can be efficiently transformed into a a discrete-log relation
SPK that is easily instantiated, by randomly generating some variables
r1 , r2 , re ∈R Z∗p and computing
A1 = g1 e g2re , A2 = Ag2 r1 , A3 = vw g2 r2 ,
α1 = r1 e, α2 = r2 e, α3 = r1 re , α4 = r2 re .
Denote by M 0 the string m||L||event||A1 ||A2 ||A3 and let 1G1 be the
identity element of G1 . The signer produces the following non-interactive
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zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge Π1 :
 

∧
A1 = g1e g2re


r1 , r2 ,

1 α1 α3

1G1 = A−r
 ∧


1 g1 g2

r
,
e,



−r
e
 
1G1 = A1 2 g1α2 g2α4
 ∧


SPK  s, rs ,  : ∧
S = us0




ê(A2 ,w)
ê(g1 ,h0 )s ê(g2 ,h0 )rs ê(g2 ,w)r1 ê(g2 ,h0 )α1


 α1 , α2 , ∧ ê(g
=

,h
)
ê(A2 ,h0 )e
0
0


ê(A3 ,q1 )
 α3 , α4
r2
∧
= ê(g2 , q1 ) ê(g2 , h)α2 ê(A3 , h)−e
ê(v,h)



















The linkable ring signature on message m in event event with ring L
is parsed as (S, A1 , A2 , A3 , Π2 ). Note that S is the linkability tag. Π1
consists of 11 elements of Zp . Details of Π1 can be found in Appendix
A.
• Sign(Revocable-iff-Link Version): It is the same as above except
adding an extra component T . Specifically, first create a signature as
in the link version (S, A1 , A2 , A3 , Π1 ). Then compute
s
R = H(S||A1 ||A2 ||A3 ||Π2 ||m||L||event), u1 = G1 (event), T = ue0 (uR
1)

and make a proof that T is correctly formed.
This can be done via the following non-interactive zero-knowledge proofof-knowledge Π2 :

SPK





(e, re , s) :


A1 = g1e g2re

s
∧ S = u0
(R)
s 
∧ T = u0 e (uR
)
1

The revocable-iff-link ring signature on message m in event event with
ring L is parsed as (S, T, A1 , A2 , A3 , Π1 , Π2 ). Note Π1 and Π2 consists of
11 and 4 elements of Zp respectively. It is straightforward to combine
Π1 and Π2 into a single proof consisting of 12 elements. We choose
to present them separately for charity. Details of Π2 can be found
in Appendix A.
• Verify: First compute u0 = G0 (event) and v as in equation (1).
In the link version, parse the signature as (S, A1 , A2 , A3 , Π1 ). Verify
the SPK Π1 .
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(M 0 )

In the revocable-iff-link version, parse the signature as (S, T, A1 , A2 , A3 ,
Π1 , Π2 ). Compute u1 = G1 (event), R = H(S||A1 ||A2 ||A3 ||Π1 ||m||L||event)
and verify the SPK Π1 and Π2 .
• Link: Two valid signatures are linked in the same event if they share
the same link tag S.
• Revoke: Given two signatures (S, T, A1 , A2 , A3 , Π1 , Π2 ) and (S, T 0 , A01 ,
A02 , A03 , Π01 , Π02 ) for an event event on message m from the set of
identities L and another message m0 from another set of identities
L0 respectively, compute R = H(S||A1 ||A2 ||A3 ||Π1 ||m||L||event) and
R0 = H(S||A01 ||A02 ||A03 ||Π01 ||m0 ||L0 ||event). Compute u0 = G0 (event)
1
R0
and U = ( TT 0 R )( R0 −R ) . For each identity ID in L ∩ L0 , output ID if and
H(ID)

only if U = u0

.

5. Security Analysis
We present the security analysis of our constructions in this section. Regarding the security of our schemes, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Our scheme Link version (resp. Revocalbe-iff-Link version)
possesses unforgeability, anonymity, linkability (resp. revocable-iff-linkability)
and non-slanderability if the q-SDH assumption holds in (G1 , G2 ), the DDH
and DL assumptions hold in Gp in the random oracle model.
The Revocable-iff-Link Version can be regarded as a generalization of the
Link Version. Thus we only show the security analysis of the Revocable-iffLink Version. In rest of this section, “our scheme” refers to the proposed
ID-Based Revocable-iff-Link Ring Signature scheme.
To prove Theorem 2, we have to show our scheme satisfies definition 5,
7, 8. Then from Theorem 1, the scheme will be unforgeable and that it will
be non-slanderable according to definition 9.
Lemma 1. Our scheme satisfies definition 5 (anonymous) if the DDH assumption in Gp holds in the random oracle model.
Proof. The proof is by reduction. Suppose there exists an adversary A that
has non-negligible advantage in wining game anonymity, we construct an
algorithm A0 that solves the DDH problem. Since it is widely believed that
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the DDH problem is hard, it implies no algorithm A exists and this complete
the proof of the lemma.
Below we show how to construct algorithm A0 . A0 is given an instance of
?
the DDH problem, (u0 , u1 , us̃0 , Z) and its task is to determine if Z = us̃1 .
A0 creates the public parameters param and the master secret key s according to the setup algorithm. param and s are given to the adversary A.
Suppose A makes qH queries to the hash oracle H with input IDi for
i = 1 to qH . A0 randomly picks an index i∗ ∈R {1, . . . , qH } and all queries
related to IDi∗ are handled differently. Likewise, assume A makes qG0 and
qG1 hash queries to hash oracle G0 and G1 respectively. A0 randomly picks
two indexes j ∗ ∈R {1, . . . , qG0 } and k ∗ ∈R {1, . . . , qG1 }. For input eventj , if
j 6= j ∗ , A0 returns (us0 )µj for some random µj ∈R Zp . For j = j ∗ , A0 returns
µ ∗
u1 j for some random µj ∗ ∈R Zp . Likewise, For input eventk , if k 6= k ∗ , A0
returns (us0 )νk for some random νk ∈R Zp . For k = k ∗ , A0 returns u1νk∗ for
some random νk∗ ∈R Zp .
For queries not related to IDi∗ , A0 answers the query following the specification. For REO query related to IDi∗ , A0 picks a random value C 0 ∈R G1
and employs the zero-knowledge simulator to simulate proof-of-knowledge.
For signature query related to IDi∗ , A0 simulates the reply as if the secret key
obtained in the REO query for IDi∗ is (A, e, s, rs ). A0 locates the hash query
for event for the signature such that event = eventj and event = eventk for
some indexes j and k. A0 proceeds only if j 6= j ∗ ∧ k 6= k ∗ . A0 sets the value
of S and T to be (us0 )µj and ue0 (us0 )Rνk respectively. Simulation is possible
because of the zero-knowledgeness of Π1 and Π2 . Note that in the view of
the adversary, it is entirely correct as for any value s, there exists a value rs
00
such that C = C 0 g1s = g1s g2rs .
Then at the challenge phase, A submits two identities ID0∗ and ID1∗ , a
message m∗ , an event event∗ and a set of n identities L∗ . A0 picks b ∈R
{0, 1}. If IDb∗ 6= IDi∗ A0 aborts and outputs a random guess. In addition,
if event∗ 6= eventj ∗ or event∗ 6= eventk∗ , A0 aborts and outputs a random
guess.
In case A0 does not abort. It creates a challenge signature as if the secret
key it obtains for IDi∗ is is (A, e, s, rs ). A0 sets the value of S and T to be
(Z)µj∗ and ue0 (Z)Rνk∗ respectively. Note that in the view of the adversary,
it is entirely correct as for any value s, there exists a value rs such that
00
C = C 0 g1s = g1s g2rs . A0 then sets the value A1 , A2 , A3 as three random
values in G1 . Note that for any value of e, there exists a value re such that
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A1 = g1e g2re . Likewise, for any values A and vw , there exists r1 , r2 such that
A2 = Ag2r1 and A3 = vw g2r2 . Thus, (A1 , A2 , A3 ) is correctly distributed in the
view of the adversary. A0 then simulates the zero-knowledge proofs Π1 and
Π2 using the values S, T , A1 , A2 , A3 .
If A finally outputs b0 = b, then A0 outputs 1 for the DDH problem.
Otherwise, A0 outputs 0.
Note that if Z = us̃1 , the challenge signature is a correct signature produced by the secret key (A, e, s, rs ) which belongs to IDb∗ . Otherwise, it
contains no information about IDb∗ in the view of the adversary and thus
based on the success of A, A0 can solve the DDH problem.
Lemma 2. Our scheme satisfies definition 7 (non-slanderable) if the DL
assumption holds in Gp in the random oracle model.
Proof. The proof is by reduction. Suppose there exists an adversary A that
has non-negligible advantage in wining game non-slanderability, we construct
an algorithm A0 that solves the DL problem. Since it is widely believed that
the DL problem is hard, it implies no algorithm A exists and this complete
the proof of the lemma.
Below we show how to construct algorithm A0 . A0 is given an instance of
∗
the DL problem (S ∗ , u∗ ) and its task is to output s∗ such that S ∗ = (u∗ )s .
A0 creates the public parameters param and the master secret key s according to the setup algorithm. param and s are given to the adversary A.
Suppose A makes qH queries to the hash oracle H with input IDi for
i = 1 to qH . A0 randomly picks an index i∗ ∈R {1, . . . , qH } and all queries
related to IDi∗ are handled differently.
For all hash queries to hash oracle G0 and G1 , A0 randomly picks a number
µ ∈R Zp and returns (u∗ )µ as the hash value.
For queries not related to IDi∗ , A0 answers the query following the specification. For REO query related to IDi∗ , A0 picks a random value C 0 ∈R G1
and employs the zero-knowledge simulator to simulate proof-of-knowledge.
For CSO queries related to IDi∗ , A0 simulates the reply as if the secret key
obtained in the REO query for IDi∗ is (A, e, s, rs ). A0 locates the hash query
for event for the signature such that G0 (event) = (u∗ )µ and G1 (event) =
0
0
(u∗ )µ . A0 sets the value of S and T to be (S ∗ )µ and ue0 (S ∗ )Rµ respectively.
Simulation is possible because of the zero-knowledgeness of Π1 and Π2 . Note
that in the view of the adversary, it is entirely correct as for any value s,
00
there exists a value rs such that C = C 0 g1s = g1s g2rs .
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Finally, A returns a valid signature σ ∗ , which is not the output from CSO,
but is linked to one of them. If it is linked to the signature created from IDi∗ ,
A0 rewinds and extracts the SPK Π1 to obtain s∗ . Then A0 returns s∗ as the
solution of the DL problem.
Lemma 3. Our scheme satisfies definition 8 (revocable-iff-linked) if the qH SDH assumption in holds in (G1 , G2 ) in the random oracle model, where
qH + 1 is the number of hash queries made by A.
Proof. The proof is by reduction. Suppose there exists an adversary A that
has non-negligible advantage in wining game revocable-iff-linkability, we construct an algorithm A0 that solves the qH -SDH problem. Under the qH -SDH
assumption, this implies no A exists and this completes the proof of the
lemma.
Below we show how to construct algorithm
A0 . A0 is given an instance of
qH
x
x
) and its task is to output a tuple
the qH -SDH problem (g10 , g20 , g20 , . . . , g20
1
0 x+e
(e, g1 ).
A0 creates the public parameters param as follows.
A0 randomly picks
QqH −1
∗
e1 , . . . eqH −1 ∈R Zp . Denote f (x) as the polynomial i=1 (x + ei ). Assume
x 6= −ei for all i. If x = −ei for some i, A0 solves the qH -SDH problem
directly. Next, A0 computes the following values.
h0 = g20

f (x)

w = g20

,

xf (x)

,

g0 = ψ(h0 ).
i

While x is unknown to A0 , it possesses its powers in the form of g20 x and
thus it is possible for A0 to compute the values h0 and w. Then, A0 picks
e∗ , a∗ , k ∗ ∈ Z∗p and computes:
h1 =

∗
∗
1/a∗
[(whe0 )k h−1
0 ]

(e∗ +x)k∗ −1
a∗

= h0

,

g1 = ψ(h1 ).
g0µ .

A0 randomly picks µ ∈ Z∗p , h ∈ G2 , sets g2 =
Other public parameters
are created following the specification. The public parameters param is given
to the adversary A.
For i = 1 to qH − 1, A0 computes
1/x+ei

A i = g0

= ψ(g20
∗

f (x)/x+ei

).

H
WLOG, we denote e∗ = eqH , AqH = g0k and e0 ∈R Z∗p . The set {(Ai , ei )qi=1
}
0
and e0 are keep private to A and are used to answer the oracle queries.
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Recall that we assume A makes qH + 1 queries to the hash oracle H.
For each hash query to oracle H, A0 chooses an index i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , qH } and
returns ei .
For each EO query on identity ID, we assume there exists an index i ∈
{0, . . . , qH } and a hash query such that ei = H(ID). Otherwise A0 made
the hash query itself. If i = 0, A0 aborts. Otherwise, A0 extracts the value
(s0 , rs ) from C 0 . This is possible due to the soundness of the zero-knowledge
proof protocol. For i 6= qH , A0 randomly picks s00 ∈ Z∗p and computes:
A = (g0 Cg2rs )1/x+ei
1+rs µ+

= (g0
=

1+rs µ−
Ai

(s0 +s00 )[(e∗ +x)k∗ −1]
a∗

(s0 +s00 )
a∗

(s0 +s00 )k∗ (e∗ +x)
a∗ (ei +x)

g0

(s0 +s00 )
(1+rs µ− a∗ )

= Ai

)1/x+ei

(s0 +s00 )k∗
a∗

g0

∗
(1− eei −e
)
+x

(s0 +s00 )k∗ (ei −e∗ )
(s0 +s00 )
)
(1+rs µ− a∗ −
a∗

= Ai

i

(s0 +s00 )k∗
a∗

g0



A0 returns (A, ei , s00 ) to A.
∗
For i = qH , A0 returns (AqH = g0k , eqH , s00 = a∗ − s0 ) to A. The value
s = s0 + s00 in each of these queries are known to A0 . Denote the value s as si
and rs as rsi in the query with index i. A0 stores (Ai , ei , si , rsi ) alongside i.
For SO query, A0 answers these queries using the zero-knowledge simulator of Π1 and Π2 .
Finally, A returns k + 1 valid signatures σj∗ on message m∗j and ring L∗j
for event event∗ for j = 0 to k, where k is a positive integer. Let L∗ be the
union of the rings L∗j .
Under the soundness of the SPK, each signature σj∗ corresponds to a set
of witnesses satisfying the following relationships.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Ae+x = g0 g1s g2rs
vwe+q = v
S = u0 s
T = u0 e uRs
1

Assume A wins by condition 1 of definition 8, then A is in possession of
at most k secret keys in L∗ . Under the assumption that the accumulator is
secure [29], e = H(ID) for some ID ∈ L∗ . Furthermore, since all these k + 1
signatures are not linked, they have different values in s. Under the discrete
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0

r0

logarithm assumption, the value of g0 g1s g2rs 6= g0 g1s g2s if s 6= s0 . This implies
there exists k + 1 distinct pairs of (A, e) in these k + 1 valid signatures. A0
randomly picks an index j and extracts the witnesses (A, e, s, rs , vw ) from the
SPK Π1 , Π2 in σj∗ . Let e = H(ID). With probability at least 1/(k + 1), one
of the following two cases is true.
• Case 1: ID has not been input to EO. With probability 1/(qH + 1),
e = e0 . If not, A0 aborts. Otherwise, A0 computes:
∗

− sk
a∗

B = Ag0

a∗
s µa∗ −s−sk∗ (e0 −e∗ )

 a∗ +r

Note that since σj∗ is a valid signature,
A

e0 +x

=

g0 g1s g2rs

=

1+rs µ+
g0

a∗ +rs µa∗ −s
a∗ (e0 +x)

A = g0



s[(e∗ +x)k∗ −1]
a∗

sk∗

g0a∗

∗
(1− ee0 −e
)
+x
0

1
x+e0

∴ B = g0

• Case 2: ID has been queried to EO and that there exists i such that
e = ei but A 6= Ai . With probability 1/(qH + 1), e = e∗ . If not, A0
aborts. Otherwise, A0 computes:
∗

− sk
a∗

B = Ag0

∗
 a∗ +raµa
∗ −s
s

Note that since σj∗ is a valid signature,
1+rs µ+

∗ +x

Ae

s[(e∗ +x)k∗ −1]
a∗

= g0 g1s g2rs = g0
a∗ +rs µa∗ −s
 ska∗∗ 
a∗ (e0 +x)
A = g0
g0
1

∴ B = g0x+e

∗

1

In both cases, A0 obtains a tuple (B, e) such that B = g0x+e . A0 computes the
polynomial a(x) of degree qH − 2 such that f (x) = (x + e)a(x) + b for some
b 6= 0 ∈ Zp (since e ∈
/ {e1 , . . . , eqH −1 }). Recall that g0 = ψ(g20 f (x) ) = g10 f (x) .
1

b

1

Thus, B = g0x+e = g10 a(x) g10 x+e . A0 outputs (e, (Bg10 −a(x) ) b ) as the solution to
the qH -SDH problem.
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Assume A wins by condition 2 of definition 8. WLOG, we let the two
signatures outputted by A and linked together are σ̇ ∗ and σ̈ ∗ on event
event∗ and that ID0 = Revoke(σ̇ ∗ , σ̈ ∗ , event∗ ). Due to the soundness of
the SPK, the two signatures are the proof-of-knowledge of two sets of witnesses (Ȧ, ė, ṡ, r˙s , v˙w ) and (Ä, ë, s̈, r¨s , v¨w ) respectively. If ė = ë, there exists
i such that ė = ë = ei (since ė, ë must be the output of the random oracle
H). Due to the soundness of the SPK and the correctness of the Revoke
algorithm, ei = H(ID0 ). Under the assumption that the accumulator is secure [29], ID0 ∈ L∗ . In that case, A wins only if ID0 has not been submitted
to EO. With probability 1/(qH + 1), ei = e0 . A0 solves the qH -SDH problem
as in case 1 in the previous condition.
˙ and ë = H(ID)
¨
Next, consider the case when ė 6= ë. Let ė = H(ID)
˙ (or ID)
¨ has not been submitted to EO, with probability
respectively. If ID
1/(qH + 1), ė = e0 (or ë = e0 ). In that case, A0 solves the qH -SDH problem
as in case 1 in the previous condition.
˙ and ID
¨ have been submitted to
Finally, consider the case that both ID
the EO oracle. In that case, either Let i̇ and ï be the indexes such that
˙ and e = H(ID).
¨
ei̇ = H(ID)
Since σ̇ ∗ and σ̈ ∗ are linked, ṡ = s̈. On the
ï
other hand, the values si̇ and sï in the corresponding EO queries are different
with overwhelming probability. The reason is that the value si in the an EO
query depends on the random number chosen by A0 and that in the query
with index qH , the value s∗ is hidden in and information-theoretic manner
before the query. WLOG, assume si̇ 6= ṡ. Under the discrete logarithm
assumption, if si̇ 6= ṡ, the value of g0 g1 si̇ g2 rsi̇ 6= g0 g1 ṡ g2ṙṡ . Thus, Ȧ 6= Ai̇ .
With probability 1/(qH + 1), ė = eqH . In that case, A0 solves the qH -SDH
problem as in case 1 in the previous condition.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new construction of ID-based Linkable Ring
Signature, with an option as Revocable-iff-Linked. Taking this option, it
is the first secure construction in the literature. When compared to other
non ID-based schemes, we enjoy a significant efficiency advantages: Both
the signature size and the linking complexity are constant, independent to
the number of users in the ring. When compared to other non revocable
ID-based linkable ring signature schemes, we also achieve a higher level of
anonymity: The PKG cannot tell the actual signer of any signature, despite
it has the secret key of every user. We prove the security of our scheme in
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the random oracle model. It is still an open problem to construct a scheme
with such desirable features and can be proven secure in the standard model.
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Appendix A. Details of SPK Π1 and Π2
Details of Π1 . The signer randomly generates ρr1 , ρr2 , ρre , ρrs , ρe , ρs , ρα1 ,
ρα2 , ρα3 , ρα4 ∈R Zp and computes
ρ

T1 = g1ρe g2 re
−ρr1 ρα1 ρα3
g1 g2
−ρr2 ρα2 ρα4
A1 g1 g2
uρ0s
ê(g1 , h0 )ρs ê(g2 , h0 )ρrs ê(g2 , w)ρr1 ê(g2 , h0 )ρα1
ê(A2 , h0 )ρe
ê(g2 , q1 )ρr2 ê(g2 , h)ρα2
ê(A3 , h)ρe

T2 = A1
T3 =
T4 =
T5 =
T6 =

Next, the signer computes c = H(T1 ||T2 ||T3 ||T4 ||T5 ||T6 ||M ). Finally, the
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signer computes
zr1
zre
ze
zα1
zα3

=
=
=
=
=

ρr1 − cr1 ,
ρre − cre ,
ρe − ce,
ρα1 − cα1 ,
ρα3 − cα3 ,

zr2
zrs
zs
zα2
zα4

=
=
=
=
=

ρr2 − cr2
ρrs − crs
ρs − cs
ρα2 − cα2
ρα4 − cα4

Output Π1 as (c, zr1 , zr2 , zre , zrs , ze , zs , zα1 , zα2 , zα3 , zα4 ).
To verify Π1 , the verifier computes the following:
z

T01 = Ac1 g1ze g2re
−zr1 zα1 zα3
g1 g2
−z
z
z
A1 r2 g1α2 g2α4
S c uz0s

T02 = A1
T03 =
T04 =

ê(A2 , w) c ê(g1 , h0 )zs ê(g2 , h0 )zrs ê(g2 , w)zr1 ê(g2 , h0 )zα1
ê(g0 , h0 )
ê(A2 , h0 )ze
ê(A3 , q1 ) c ê(g2 , q1 )zr2 ê(g2 , h)zα2
T06 =
ê(v, h)
ê(A3 , h)ze
T05 =

The verifier then outputs 1 if c = H(T01 ||T02 ||T03 ||T04 ||T05 ||T06 ||M ) and 0
otherwise.
Details of Π2 . The signer randomly generates ρe , ρre , ρs ∈R Zp and computes
ρ

T1 = g1ρe g2 re
T2 = uρ0s
ρs
T3 = uρ0e (uR
1)

Next, the signer computes c = H(T1 ||T2 ||T3 ||R). Finally, the signer
computes
ze = ρe − ce, zre = ρre − cre , zs = ρs − cs
Output Π2 as (c, ze , zre , zs ).
To verify Π2 , the verifier computes the following:
z

T01 = Ac1 g1ze g2re
T02 = S c uz0s
zs
T03 = T c uz0e (uR
1)

The verifier then outputs 1 if c = H(T01 ||T02 ||T03 ||R) and 0 otherwise.
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